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NAFTA'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS: WHAT
PROBLEMS WERE THEY INTENDED TO ADDRESS?
John H. Knox

The title of this panel discussion is NAFrA's environmental provisions: are they working as intended and are they adequate? I am going
to try to lay some groundwork for that discussion by talking about a
preliminary question or two. Before we talk about whether they are
working as intended, we have to talk about how they were intended to
work and, in particular, what problems they were intended to solve.
In one sense, the main problem that the NAFTA environmental side
agreement was designed to solve was a political problem facing thenGovernor Bill Clinton in 1992. The NAFTA was finalized just as the
presidential election was entering the final stretch. On the one hand,
Clinton had strong reasons to oppose the agreement that had been negotiated by the Bush administration. Apart from the fact that he, like any
politician, would have liked to have been able to oppose anything his
opponent supported, he also wanted to draw support from the traditionally Democratic constituencies of labor and the environmental community, who had for some time made it clear that they were going to oppose
NAFTA.
On the other hand, Bill Clinton was a "New Democrat," and New
Democrats believe in international trade. So he wanted a way to be able
to support NAFTA and oppose it at the same time. And lo and behold,
a month before the presidential election, he found that way. He announced that he opposed the NAFTA as it had been signed by President
Bush, but he supported it as it would be fixed by President Clinton after
the election, through the addition of side agreements on labor and the
environment.
After President Clinton took office, he faced another political problem: getting NAFTA through Congress. NAFTA is not a treaty under
the U.S. Constitution, so it did not need advice and consent from the
Senate. It did, however, have to be approved by both houses of Con. John Knox is an attorney with the law firm of Bickerstaff, Heath, Smiley, Pollan, Kever
& McDaniel in Austin, Texas.
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gress. To obtain the necessary votes from Democrats in Congress, President Clinton needed to address their labor and environmental concerns
in a way that would allow at least some of them to support the agreement.
What concerns did he have to address? Although labor is not the
focus of this panel, it is worth noting that the labor concerns were much
more intractable than the environmental issues. There was never any
chance that a labor side agreement would cause labor unions to support
NAFTA, since it could not, or would not, address the unions' basic
concern - the difference between Mexican and U.S. wages.
It did seem possible, however, to address at least some of the
environmental concerns. In early 1993, seven major environmental
groups offered President Clinton a deal: they would support NAFTA if
the side agreement met their concerns.
What were those concerns? I think at the risk of oversimplification,
one can divide the environmental concerns with NAFTA into three
major areas. Moving from south-to-north and putting them into headline
form, they are as follows: first, Mexico is a pollution haven; second, the
U.SJMexico border area is a cesspool; and third, NAFTA will destroy
U.S. sovereignty by overturning U.S. environmental laws.
First is the notion that Mexico is a "pollution haven." The idea here
is that Mexico, like any developing country, has lower environmental
standards, at least in practice, than the United States does. Their lower
standards will act as a magnet drawing U.S. companies south of the
border to relocate. This, in turn, has several secondary effects: the Mexican problems with the environment get worse; U.S. jobs are lost; and
there is pressure on the United States to lower its own standards in a
kind of race to the bottom.
You can dispute those assertations from an economic point of view.
But there is a deeper concern there, which was never addressed satisfactorily by the Bush Administration, and that is the idea that somehow it
is unfair for U.S. companies to avoid U.S. environmental laws by shifting their operations south of the border and then selling the goods that
they produce there or that their subsidiaries produce there in competition
with companies that stay here and comply with U.S. standards.
How did the environmental groups propose to deal with the "pollution haven" problem? They proposed an international commission with
the authority to oversee enforcement in Mexico and the other North
American countries, and to impose sanctions on them if they did not
adequately enforce their own laws. The second problem was the
U.SiMexico border area. This had been an area of concern for a long
time among environmental groups who believed that NAFTA would
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make the border environment's problems even worse. The maquiladora
industry has grown at such a pace in northern Mexico that it has far
outstripped the capacity of the local infrastructure, and particularly the
environmental infrastructure. In addition, many communities on the U.S.
side of the border, particularly the unincorporated developments called
colonies, lack adequate water and waste-water facilities. Moreover, pollution from either side of the border causes harm to both sides, since
border communities share common watersheds and air sheds.
The environmental groups believed that through NAFTA, the governments should take some responsibility for trying to address this problem. One proposal was to impose a tax or a tariff on goods that crossed
the border, and devote the funds to cleaning up the border environment.
The third area of concern was the idea that U.S. environmental laws
are at risk from trade agreements. NAFTA, in particular, became the
focus of this concern because it was negotiated shortly after the 1991
"tuna/dolphin" decision by a GATT panel, which indicated that the
Marine Mammal Protection Act's restrictions on imports of tuna violated
the United States' obligations under GATT. The tuna/dolphin decision
sent a shock wave through the U.S. environmental community. For the
first time, they realized that U.S. environmental laws that restricted
imports from other countries for environmental reasons might run afoul
of international trade agreements. And so they wanted NAFTA rewritten
to protect those laws.
The Bush Administration in some ways had addressed all three of
these problems. They had addressed the pollution haven problem by
including a provision in the investment chapter of NAFTA in which the
governments agreed that they should not lower their environmental standards to attract foreign investment. The "should" was intentionally used
to avoid making this commitment a legal obligation in the way that, of
course, everything else in the agreement was. The Bush Administration
also had negotiated a border plan with Mexico to try to improve the
U.S .Mexico border environment. And it had made some improvements
in the NAFTA over the GATT to try to address possible conflicts between U.S. environmental laws and international trade regimes. None of
these efforts satsified the environmental community, however, which
regarded them all as too weak.
So what did the Clinton Administration do? It spent most of the
spring and summer of 1993 negotiating two environmental side agreements, each of which addresses one of these areas of concern. The main
side agreement, the one that all three countries joined, addresses the
problem of pollution havens. It requires the governments to effectively
enforce their own environmental laws. The agreement prohibits them
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from lowering their environmental standards and requires them to try to
improve them. It creates a mechanism by which a new international
organization, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, can hear
complaints from citizens whose governments are failing to enforce their
own environmental laws.
Finally, the agreement provides for sanctions against any country
that is found to have engaged in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws. Those sanctions will probably
never be used. Referring a dispute over an alleged failure to effectively
enforce to an arbitral panel takes a two-thirds vote of the three members
of the commission. I think it is extremely unlikely that two of the three
countries will ever send a complaint against the third country to arbitration. It is barely conceivable that Mexico and Canada might join against
the United States. But it is next to impossible that either Mexico or
Canada would ever join with the United States to refer a complaint
against the other to arbitration. The dispute resolution process, if it were
invoked, is complicated and time-consuming. But it does have the possibility of sanctions, at the end of the process.
The United States and Mexico negotiated another side agreement to
address the U.SJMexico border environment. Not surprisingly, the two
countries found it difficult to imagine putting a tariff on goods at the
same time that NAFTA was supposed to be reducing tariffs, so that idea
never really went very far. Instead, they created a new development
bank called the North American Development Bank, which would be
able to make loans to communities on either side of the border to help
them develop their water, wastewater, and solid waste facilities. Critics
pointed out that the bank could only make loans, not grants, and said
that adding another institution to lend poor communities money at market rates was not useful, since these communities could not afford to
use it. (However, the EPA and the Bank have recently agreed that the
Bank would be able to give border communities grants for environmental infrastructure projects, with money provided by the EPA).
The third area of concern -- the conflict between trade agreements
and U.S. environmental laws -- was not addressed. The tuna/dolphin
case had turned, in part, on the idea that the GATT prohibited the United States from using as a basis for import restriction the way in which
Mexico caught tuna. The U.S. law restricted imports of tuna that were
caught in a way that was unsafe for dolphins. The GATT panel said
that restrictions based on process or production methods were impermissible under GATT.
The environmentalists very much wanted the primary environmental
side agreement to address this issue, or at least put it on the future
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work agenda of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. The
topic was so sensitive to Mexico and Canada, however, that they would
not even agree that the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
could discuss "process and production methods." Instead, the parties
agreed on the code words: "environmental implications of goods
throughout their life cycles." And in fact, the Commission has never
tried to resolve, or even discuss, the issues raised by the tuna/dolphin
case.
But I do not want to close on that note. On a much more positive
note, the environmental side agreement was intended to do something
much more important than address NAFrA's environmental problems. It
created a new institution, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, which has as its mandate the North American environment as a
whole. The side agreement is much, much broader than trade-related
issues, although those are included, of course. It creates a process for
the governments to be able to talk together on a regional basis about
environmental issues, which in itself is extremely important. More important, it creates an independent secretariat, with the authority and the
ability to prepare reports, make investigations, and hire experts to look
at all kinds of issues having to do with the North American environment. That has the potential to be extremely promising. I think the
Commission may add a new voice to the North American debate over
environmental issues which is not beholden to governments, business, or
environmental groups and which, at the same time, is respected by all
of those groups. That would be extremely valuable in many ways that
go far beyond NAFIA and its environmental problems.

